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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
No. 14-4073 
MARK LEYSE,  
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, 
                                  Appellant 
v. 
BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
_____________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-11-cv-07128) 
District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton 
_____________ 
Argued: July 7, 2015 
Before: FUENTES, SLOVITER, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
(Opinion Filed:  October 14, 2015 ) 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.  
Mark Leyse brought an action under the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act after receiving a prerecorded 
telemarketing call on the landline he shares with his 
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roommate. Leyse was not the intended recipient of the call—
his roommate was.  For this reason, the District Court 
dismissed the complaint for lack of statutory standing.  We 
find that it was error for the District Court to consider the 
motion to dismiss, which raised an argument that could have 
been raised in an earlier motion to dismiss.  As the procedural 
error was harmless, however, we reach the merits and 
conclude that Leyse has statutory standing.  His status as a 
regular user of the phone line and occupant of the residence 
that was called brings him within the language of the Act and 
the zone of interests it protects. 
 
I. Background 
 
A telemarketer seeking to advertise credit cards for 
Bank of America called the phone shared by Mark Leyse and 
his roommate, Genevieve Dutriaux.  It is undisputed that 
Dutriaux was the telephone subscriber and intended recipient 
of the call, as the number was associated with her name in the 
telemarketing company’s records.  When the phone was 
answered—the complaint does not specify whether either 
roommate or the answering machine picked up—a 
prerecorded message played.  
 
This message allegedly violated the advertising 
restrictions of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 
1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227, as well as its associated regulations.  
The Act prohibits any person from, among other things, 
“initiat[ing] any telephone call to any residential telephone 
line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a 
message without the prior express consent of the called party, 
unless the call is initiated for emergency purposes or is 
exempted by rule or order by the [Federal Communications] 
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Commission.”  Id. § 227(b)(1)(B).1  As a result of the 
prerecorded message, a lawyer representing Dutriaux and 
Leyse filed several class-action lawsuits against Bank of 
America in multiple districts.  The action on appeal before us 
is from the District of New Jersey. Leyse is the only named 
plaintiff. 
 
Bank of America filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss on grounds of collateral estoppel, arguing that one of 
the prior lawsuits had been decided against Leyse in a manner 
that precluded further litigation.  The District Court agreed 
and further found that Leyse’s complaint was time-barred.  
On appeal, a panel of this Court initially affirmed, then 
changed its mind on panel rehearing.  The panel found that 
the statute of limitations was tolled, and that collateral 
estoppel was inapplicable because it was unclear whether the 
dispositive issue here was actually adjudicated in the prior 
lawsuit.  In vacating the dismissal, the panel noted that on 
remand, Bank of America might be able to argue that Leyse 
lacked statutory standing as the unintended recipient of the 
automated call. 
 
Bank of America did just that.  It filed a second Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that Leyse was not the 
“called party” identified in § 227(b)(1)(B) and therefore did 
not have statutory standing to bring suit.  Leyse responded 
that the motion was procedurally improper under Rule 12, as 
the Bank could have raised its statutory standing argument in 
                                              
1 Although it is not relevant to this appeal, Bank of America’s 
position is that the call was an “abandoned” call of the sort 
permitted by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(7).  
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its previous motion but chose not to. He also contended 
another part of the statute, § 227(b)(3), gives a private right of 
action to any “person or entity” injured by the violation—not 
merely the “called party.”  
 
The District Court sided with Bank of America on both 
questions and dismissed Leyse’s complaint.  It reasoned that 
Leyse was not the “called party,” which it defined as the 
intended recipient of the call, and therefore did not fall within 
the class of plaintiffs authorized to sue under the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act. Leyse appealed.2 
 
II. Discussion 
 
A. Rule 12 Restrictions on Successive Motions to 
Dismiss 
 
 Leyse’s first argument on appeal is that the District 
Court erred in considering Bank of America’s second motion 
to dismiss, which he contends was filed in violation of the 
                                              
2 Although our Court had previously held otherwise, “federal 
and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over private suits 
arising under the [Telephone Consumer Protection Act].”  
Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 745 (2012).  
The District Court therefore had federal-question jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and 
over issues of statutory interpretation.  Gager v. Dell Fin. 
Servs., LLC, 727 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013).  
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  His claim of error is valid, 
but it does not warrant reversal.  
 The Rules impose restrictions on the filing of 
successive motions to dismiss: “Except as provided in Rule 
12(h)(2) or (3), a party that makes a motion under [Rule 12] 
must not make another motion under [Rule 12] raising a 
defense or objection that was available to the party but 
omitted from its earlier motion.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2).  
This “consolidation rule” is intended “to eliminate 
unnecessary delay at the pleading stage” by encouraging “the 
presentation of an omnibus pre-answer motion in which the 
defendant advances every available Rule 12 defense” 
simultaneously rather than “interposing these defenses and 
objections in piecemeal fashion.”  Charles Alan Wright & 
Arthur R. Miller, 5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1384 (3d ed. 
2014).  
 
 Bank of America’s first motion to dismiss, which 
asserted collateral estoppel, was expressly brought under Rule 
12.  See also Metro. Edison Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 
767 F.3d 335, 350 n.19 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that collateral 
estoppel is a permissible basis for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim).  As Bank of America 
concedes, it could have argued in this motion that Leyse 
lacked statutory standing, but it did not.  Thus, unless one of 
the exceptions specified in Rule 12(g)(2) applies—i.e., those 
established in Rule 12(h)(2) and (3)—the Bank’s subsequent 
Rule 12 motion to dismiss on statutory standing grounds was 
procedurally barred.  
 
 The second motion to dismiss does not qualify for the 
Rule 12(h)(3) exception, which exempts only motions to 
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  Unlike Article 
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III standing, statutory standing is not jurisdictional.  See 
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 1377, 1388 & n.4 (2014).  Statutory standing goes to 
whether Congress has accorded a particular plaintiff the right 
to sue under a statute, but it does not limit the power of the 
court to adjudicate the case.  See id.  As a result, “[a] 
dismissal for lack of statutory standing is effectively the same 
as a dismissal for failure to state a claim,” and a motion to 
dismiss on this ground is brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), 
rather than Rule 12(b)(1).  Baldwin v. Univ. of Pittsburgh 
Med. Ctr., 636 F.3d 69, 73-74 (3d Cir. 2011); see also 
Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 307 (3d Cir. 2011).3 
  
 The motion does not fall within the Rule 12(h)(2) 
exception either.  Under this provision, a successive motion to 
dismiss for “[f]ailure to state a claim . . . may be raised (A) in 
                                              
3 We have, in the past, suggested that “statutory standing is an 
issue of subject matter jurisdiction.”  Graden v. Conexant Sys. 
Inc., 496 F.3d 291, 294 (3d Cir. 2007).  But we have since 
retreated from this characterization, and the Supreme Court 
has made clear that it is incorrect. Indeed, our description of 
statutory standing in Graden showed that it was non-
jurisdictional.  See id. at 295 (“Though all are termed 
‘standing,’ the differences between statutory, constitutional, 
and prudential standing are important. Constitutional and 
prudential standing are about, respectively, the constitutional 
power of a federal court to resolve a dispute and the wisdom 
of so doing. Statutory standing is simply statutory 
interpretation: the question it asks is whether Congress has 
accorded this injured plaintiff the right to sue the defendant to 
redress his injury.”  (citations omitted)).  
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any pleading allowed or ordered under Rule 7(a); (B) by a 
motion under Rule 12(c); or (C) at trial.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(h)(2).  Bank of America’s second motion to dismiss was 
plainly neither a Rule 7(a) pleading nor a motion raised at 
trial.  Nor was it a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, which may be filed only “[a]fter the pleadings are 
closed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).  Thus, because no exception to 
Rule 12(g)(2) covers Bank of America’s successive motion, it 
was improper to consider that motion.  
 
 The District Court’s conclusion to the contrary was 
error.  Following other district court decisions, the District 
Court held that it could consider Bank of America’s second 
motion to dismiss because the previous motion had not 
“examine[d] the substance” of Leyse’s claims but rather 
challenged it on collateral estoppel grounds.  (App. 8 n.3 
(quoting Walzer v. Muriel Siebert & Co., Civ. No. 04-5672 
(DRD), 2010 WL 4366197, at *10 (D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2010), 
aff’d sub nom. Walzer v. Muriel Siebert & Co., 447 F. App’x 
377 (3d Cir. 2011)).)  The procedural bar of Rule 12(g)(2), 
however, covers all motions to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim, regardless of the grounds asserted.  The District Court 
provided no basis for concluding otherwise, and we see none.  
Indeed, Bank of America easily could have included its 
statutory standing argument in the same motion as its 
collateral estoppel argument, which is the sort of 
consolidation that Rule 12(g)(2) is meant to encourage.  If it 
had done so, it is likely that one of the two appeals could have 
been avoided.4  
                                              
4 Bank of America seems to suggest that when the case was 
previously on appeal, the panel expressly gave it permission 
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 We also recognize that the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit would find no error on the facts before us.  In 
Ennenga v. Starns, the defendants filed two pre-answer 
motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), only the second of 
which argued that the plaintiffs’ claims were untimely.  In 
finding the second motion proper, the Seventh Circuit held 
that “Rule 12(g)(2) does not prohibit a new Rule 12(b)(6) 
argument from being raised in a successive motion” because 
“Rule 12(h)(2) specifically excepts failure-to-state-a-claim 
defenses from the Rule 12(g) consolidation requirement.”  
677 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir. 2012).  We respectfully disagree.  
Like the Tenth Circuit, we find that Ennenga’s logic “fails to 
address the language from Rule 12(h)(2) that arguably limits 
a party to presenting [successive failure-to-state-a-claim] 
arguments in a pleading, a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, or at trial.”  See Albers v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of 
Jefferson Cnty., Colo., 771 F.3d 697, 703 (10th Cir. 2014).  
                                                                                                     
to raise the issue of statutory standing in a subsequent motion.  
See Leyse v. Bank of Am., Nat. Ass’n, 538 F. App’x 156, 162 
(3d Cir. 2013).  The panel did not address Rule 12(g)(2), 
however, and it did not specify that the Bank was permitted to 
file another pre-answer motion, as opposed to the post-answer 
Rule 12(c) motion contemplated by Rule 12(h)(2).  The 
panel’s passing comment certainly does not constitute “law of 
the case.”  See, e.g., Pub. Interest Research Grp. of New 
Jersey, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 116 
(3d Cir. 1997) (“The law of the case doctrine directs courts to 
refrain from re-deciding issues that were resolved earlier in 
the litigation. . . . [The] doctrine does not limit a federal 
court's power; rather, it directs its exercise of discretion.”).  
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The Sixth Circuit would likely agree with us as well.  See 
English v. Dyke, 23 F.3d 1086, 1090-91 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 
 Despite the District Court’s error, it does not follow 
that we must vacate its decision.  When considering an 
appeal, we must give judgment “without regard to errors or 
defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties.”  28 U.S.C. § 2111. A district court’s decision to 
consider a successive Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is 
usually harmless, even if it technically violates Rule 12(g)(2).  
So long as the district court accepts all of the allegations in 
the complaint as true, the result is the same as if the defendant 
had filed an answer admitting these allegations and then filed 
a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, which 
Rule 12(h)(2)(B) expressly permits. 
  
 Requiring these additional steps would serve little 
purpose here.  If we vacate and remand without ruling on the 
merits, Bank of America will inevitably raise its arguments in 
a post-answer Rule 12(c) motion, and the case will come up 
on appeal a third time.  Creating such delay seems contrary to 
the purposes of Rule 12(g)(2).5  We note that in so holding, 
                                              
5 We emphasize that district courts should enforce Rule 
12(g)(2) even if their failure to do so is not a ground for 
reversal.  Although some courts and commentators believe 
that allowing successive pre-answer motions to dismiss 
avoids delay, this seems to us like short-term thinking.  In any 
given case, requiring a defendant to file an answer and then a 
Rule 12(c) motion will take more time than allowing it to file 
a successive pre-answer Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  But over the 
long term, stringent application of Rule 12(g)(2) may 
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we are in agreement with the Tenth Circuit, which declined to 
reverse on similar facts because the asserted Rule 12(g)(2) 
error was harmless.  See Albers, 771 F.3d at 703-04.  We 
therefore proceed to the merits. 
 
B. Statutory Standing under the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act 
 
 1. Background 
 
 The Telephone Consumer Protection Act was intended 
to combat, among other things, the proliferation of automated 
telemarketing calls (known as “robocalls”) to private 
residences, which Congress viewed as a nuisance and an 
invasion of privacy.  See Mims, 132 S. Ct. at 745.  To this 
end, the Act makes it unlawful “to initiate any telephone call 
to any residential telephone line using an artificial or 
prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior 
express consent of the called party, unless the call is initiated 
for emergency purposes or is exempted by rule or order by 
the Commission.”  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B).  In the same 
subsection of the Act, the paragraph captioned “Private right 
of action” provides that a “person or entity” may bring an 
                                                                                                     
motivate defendants to consolidate their arguments in a single 
pre-answer motion, especially if they know that the district 
court will not stay discovery while a post-answer Rule 12(c) 
motion is pending.  Granted, the logic of deterrence could 
also support enforcing Rule 12(g)(2) on appeal.  The length of 
the appellate process, however, increases the costs of 
enforcement and suggests that the balance should be struck 
differently.  
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action to enjoin violations of the statute and recover actual 
damages or $500 in statutory damages per violation.  Id. § 
227(b)(3).  
 
 District courts throughout the country have split over 
the question of who is entitled to sue under the statute, and 
they fall into various camps.  Some district court cases hold 
that statutory standing is limited to the “called party,” which 
they define as the “intended recipient” of the call.6  Others 
indicate that statutory standing is limited to the “called party” 
but define that term as the “subscriber” or “regular user” of 
the phone.7  Several cases do not invoke the statutory term 
“called party” but nevertheless find it prudent to limit 
statutory standing to the “subscriber” or “primary user.”8  
                                              
6 Cellco P’ship v. Wilcrest Health Care Mgmt. Inc., No. 
CIV.A. 09-3534 MLC, 2012 WL 1638056, at *7 (D.N.J. May 
8, 2012); Cellco P’ship v. Dealers Warranty, LLC, No. 
CIV.A. 09-1814 FLW, 2010 WL 3946713, at *9-10 (D.N.J. 
Oct. 5, 2010); Leyse v. Bank of Am., Nat. Ass’n, No. 09 CIV. 
7654 (JGK), 2010 WL 2382400, at *3-6 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 
2010).  
7 Soulliere v. Cent. Florida Inv., Inc., No. 8:13-CV-2860-T-
27AEP, 2015 WL 1311046, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2015); 
Pacleb v. Cops Monitoring, No. 2:14-CV-01366-CAS, 2014 
WL 3101426, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2014); Fini v. Dish 
Network L.L.C., 955 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1296 & n.6 (M.D. Fla. 
2013). 
8 Olney v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 993 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 
1225 (S.D. Cal. 2014); Cellco P’ship v. Plaza Resorts Inc., 
No. 12-81238-CIV, 2013 WL 5436553, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 
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And many cases reject the “called party” approach on the 
ground that the Act authorizes any “person or entity” to sue.9 
 The District Court here falls into the first camp.  It 
dismissed Leyse’s claim on the ground that, as the 
“unintended and incidental recipient” of a call directed to his 
roommate, he was not the “called party” and therefore had no 
right to sue under the Act.  (App. 13.)  We, however, do not 
                                                                                                     
27, 2013); Gutierrez v. Barclays Grp., No. 10CV1012 DMS 
BGS, 2011 WL 579238, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2011). 
9 Gesten v. Stewart Law Grp., LLC, 67 F. Supp. 3d 1356, 
1359 (S.D. Fla. 2014); Meyer v. Diversified Consultants, Inc., 
No. 3:14-CV-393-J-34JBT, 2014 WL 5471114, at *2 (M.D. 
Fla. Oct. 29, 2014); Moore v. Dish Network L.L.C., 57 F. 
Supp. 3d 639, 648-51 (N.D.W. Va. 2014); Manno v. 
Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 289 F.R.D. 674, 
682 (S.D. Fla. 2013); Swope v. Credit Mgmt., LP, No. 
4:12CV832 CDP, 2013 WL 607830, at *2-3 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 
19, 2013); Page v. Regions Bank, 917 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 
1216-18 (N.D. Ala. 2012); Harris v. World Fin. Network Nat. 
Bank, 867 F. Supp. 2d 888, 894 (E.D. Mich. 2012); Kane v. 
Nat’l Action Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 11-CV-11505, 2011 WL 
6018403, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 2011); D.G. v. Diversified 
Adjustment Serv., Inc., No. 11 C 2062, 2011 WL 5506078, at 
*2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2011); Tang v. Med. Recovery 
Specialists, LLC, No. 11 C 2109, 2011 WL 6019221, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. July 7, 2011); D.G. ex rel. Tang v. William W. 
Siegel & Associates, Attorneys at Law, LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 
622, 624-25 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Anderson v. AFNI, Inc., No. 
CIV.A. 10-4064, 2011 WL 1808779, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. May 
11, 2011). 
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agree that the caller’s intent circumscribes standing, and we 
find that Leyse falls within the class of plaintiffs Congress 
has authorized to sue.  
 2.  The zone of interests protected by the Act 
 
 The paragraph that establishes the “[p]rivate right of 
action” for violations of the Act’s robocall provisions permits 
any “person or entity” to file a lawsuit. 47 U.S.C.  
§ 227(b)(3).  The text of this provision does not limit the 
universe of plaintiffs who may file suit in federal court.10  
 
 Even if this were all the Act said (which it is not), 
Congress’s broad grant of statutory standing would not enable 
every “person or entity” to sue under the Act.  Article III of 
the Constitution imposes its own standing requirements, and 
only certain plaintiffs will have suffered the particularized 
injury required to maintain an action in federal court for a 
statutory violation.  See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818-20 
& n.3 (1997); Doe v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Examiners, 199 F.3d 
                                              
10 In full, the relevant portion of the paragraph states that “[a] 
person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or 
rules of court of a State, bring [an action] in an appropriate 
court of that State.”  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).  But it “does not 
state that a private plaintiff may bring an action under the 
[Act] ‘only’ in state court, or ‘exclusively’ in state court,” and 
as a result the Supreme Court has held that federal courts 
have concurrent jurisdiction over such actions. Mims, 132 S. 
Ct. at 750.  Any limitations imposed by “the laws or rules of 
court of a State” presumably would not apply in federal court. 
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146, 153 (3d Cir. 1999).11  Someone with a generalized 
interest in punishing telemarketers, for example, would not 
qualify on that basis alone.  Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992).  
 But here, Article III is not the only barrier faced by 
potential plaintiffs.  Congress surely did not intend, for 
example, to enable a plaintiff to sue merely because she 
learned that a friend or neighbor had received a robocall.  
This commonsense judgment is embodied in an interpretive 
doctrine of special importance here: the “presum[ption] that a 
statutory cause of action extends only to plaintiffs whose 
interests ‘fall within the zone of interests protected by the law 
invoked.’”  Lexmark Int’l, 134 S. Ct. at 1388 (quoting Allen v. 
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).  
 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Lexmark is 
instructive.  There, the Court was called upon to construe the 
Lanham Act, which “authorizes suit by ‘any person who 
believes that he or she is likely to be damaged’ by a 
defendant’s false advertising.”  Id. at 1388 (quoting 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a)(1)).  “Read literally, that broad language might 
suggest that an action is available to anyone who can satisfy 
the minimum requirements of Article III.”  Id.  The Supreme 
Court, however, found it unlikely that “Congress meant to 
allow all factually injured plaintiffs to recover.”  Id.  (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 
                                              
11 Notably, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case 
that will require it to consider the limits on Congress’s power 
to confer Article III standing on plaintiffs.  See Spokeo, Inc. v. 
Robins, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (2015). 
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 Instead, the Court invoked the “presum[ption] that a 
statutory cause of action extends only to plaintiffs whose 
interests ‘fall within the zone of interests protected by the law 
invoked.’”  Id.  (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 751).  Because 
Congress is assumed to legislate against the background of 
this “zone of interests” limitation, it “applies to all statutorily 
created causes of action.”  Id.  The breadth of the zone of 
interests depends on the provisions and purposes of the statute 
being analyzed.  See id.  In Lexmark, the Court analyzed the 
Lanham Act’s detailed list of purposes and concluded that a 
false-advertising plaintiff “must allege an injury to a 
commercial interest in reputation or sales,” rather than injury 
to its interests as a consumer of a product.  Id. at 1390.  
 
 We apply a similar analysis here.  Within the 
subsection of the Act at issue in this appeal, 47 U.S.C. § 
227(b) (entitled “Restrictions on use of automated telephone 
equipment”), the first paragraph sets forth “[p]rohibitions,” 
id. § 227(b)(1); the second discusses the FCC’s authority to 
promulgate “[r]egulations,” id. § 227(b)(2); and the third 
creates a “[p]rivate right of action” for “a violation of this 
subsection,” id. § 227(b)(3).12  In order to delineate the zone 
of interests protected by the statute, it makes sense to start by 
looking at the prohibitions that the private right of action is 
intended to enforce.  
                                              
12 In using the term “subsection,” Congress ordinarily refers 
to the statutory subdivisions that are labeled with lowercase 
letters—(a), (b), (c), and so forth.  Within subsections, 
“paragraphs” are labeled with numbers, and “subparagraphs” 
are labeled with uppercase letters.  See Koons Buick Pontiac 
GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 60-61 (2004).  
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 The “Prohibitions” paragraph makes it “unlawful for 
any person within the United States, or any person outside the 
United States if the recipient is within the United States,” to 
transmit certain types of telephone calls and facsimiles. Id. § 
227(b)(1).  It contains four subparagraphs, each of which 
identifies the “recipient” and type of communication at issue.  
Id.  
 
 The first subparagraph forbids using an “automated 
telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice” 
without the consent of the “called party” when calling 
emergency telephone lines, hospital patient rooms, pagers, 
cell phones, or any service for which the “called party” would 
be charged.  Id. § 227(b)(1)(A).  The second subparagraph, 
which Bank of America is accused of violating, proscribes 
“using an artificial or recorded voice” when calling “any 
residential telephone line” without the consent of the “called 
party.”  Id. § 227(b)(1)(B).  The third prohibits sending 
“unsolicited advertisement[s]” by facsimile to a “recipient.”  
Id. § 227(b)(1)(C).  And the fourth prohibits using “an 
automatic telephone dialing system” to tie up two or more 
telephone lines of a “multi-line business” simultaneously.  Id. 
§ 227(b)(1)(D). 
 
 In the subparagraph at issue here, the “called party” is 
relevant because its prior consent to receiving robocalls 
provides a defense to liability.  Id. § 227(b)(1)(B).  Thus, 
although Congress did not expressly limit standing to the 
“called party,” its primary concern in enacting § 227(b)(1)(B) 
was to protect that party from unwanted robocalls.  This 
necessarily means that the “called party” is within the zone of 
interests protected by the Act.  
 18 
 
 
 The District Court determined that the term “called 
party” refers to the intended recipient of the robocall, rather 
than the actual recipient.  And, because Leyse was not the 
intended recipient, the Court held he lacked standing.  There 
are good reasons to doubt the equation of “intended recipient” 
with “called party,”13 but the parties did not brief the issue, 
                                              
13 In its findings in support of the Act, Congress appears to 
equate the “called party” with the “receiving party.”  
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-243, § 2(12), 105 Stat. 2394 (note following 47 U.S.C. § 
227).  Subsection 227(b)(1) itself suggests that the “called 
party” is the actual “recipient.”  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1).  
Indeed, we referred to it as the “recipient” in another case 
construing the Act. See Gager, 727 F.3d at 269.  The Seventh 
and Eleventh Circuits have concluded from the Act’s text and 
structure that the term “called party” refers to “the person 
subscribing to the called number at the time the call is made,” 
rather than the intended recipient of the call.  Soppet v. 
Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC, 679 F.3d 637, 643 (7th Cir. 
2012); see also Osorio, 746 F.3d at 1251-52.  Their reasoning 
also suggests, however, that the “person who answers the 
call” may qualify as well.  Soppet, 679 F.3d at 640.  Perhaps 
most significantly, however, the FCC recently issued a 
declaratory ruling defining “called party” as “the subscriber, 
i.e., the consumer assigned the telephone number dialed and 
billed for the call, or the non-subscriber customary user of a 
telephone number included in a family or business calling 
plan.”  In the Matter of Rules & Regulations Implementing 
the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, 
WC Docket No. 07-135, FCC 15-72, 2015 WL 4387780, at 
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and we need not decide it here.  This is because—as was the 
case with the Lanham Act in Lexmark—Congress made 
several findings in the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
that allow us to trace the contours of the protected zone of 
interests.  The zone protected by § 227(b)(1)(B) may well be 
coextensive with the scope of the term “called party.”  But 
given the existence of relevant congressional findings, we 
may determine whether Leyse has statutory standing without 
first concluding that he is a “called party.” 
 
 In passing the Act, Congress was animated by 
“outrage[] over the proliferation” of prerecorded 
telemarketing calls to private residences, which consumers 
regarded as “an intrusive invasion of privacy” and “a 
nuisance.”  Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(5)-(6), (10), 105 Stat. 2394 (note 
following 47 U.S.C.  
§ 227); see also id. § 2(9), (12)-(13).  The congressional 
findings describe the persons aggrieved by these calls using a 
variety of labels: “consumers,” “residential telephone 
subscribers,” and “receiving part[ies].”  Id. § 2(5)-(6), (10)-
(12).  
 
 The task facing Congress was that “[i]ndividuals’ 
privacy rights, public safety interests, and commercial 
freedoms of speech and trade must be balanced in a way that 
protects the privacy of individuals and permits legitimate 
                                                                                                     
*26 ¶ 73 (F.C.C. July 10, 2015) (Declaratory Ruling and 
Order); see also id. at *26-27 ¶¶ 72-77, *28 ¶ 78 (rejecting 
“proposals that we interpret ‘called party’ to be the ‘intended 
recipient’ or ‘intended called party’”). 
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telemarketing practices.”  Id. § 2(9). In striking this balance, 
Congress determined that “[b]anning . . . automated or 
prerecorded telephone calls to the home, except when the 
receiving party consents to receiving the call or when such 
calls are necessary in an emergency situation affecting the 
health and safety of the consumer, is the only effective means 
of protecting telephone consumers from this nuisance and 
privacy invasion.”  Id. § 2(12). 
 As was forcefully stated by Senator Hollings, the Act’s 
sponsor, “Computerized calls are the scourge of modern 
civilization. They wake us up in the morning; they interrupt 
our dinner at night; they force the sick and elderly out of bed; 
they hound us until we want to rip the telephone right out of 
the wall.”  137 Cong. Rec. 30,821-22 (1991). Although his 
views are not controlling, see Mims, 132 S. Ct. at 752, they 
are consistent with the findings that appear in the text of the 
Act, and it is relevant that he emphasized the potential of 
robocalls to harass the occupants of private residences. See 
also Osorio v. State Farm Bank, F.S.B., 746 F.3d 1242, 1258 
(11th Cir. 2014) (noting that a purpose of the Act is to protect 
“residential privacy”).  
 
 From this evidence, it is clear that the Act’s zone of 
interests encompasses more than just the intended recipients 
of prerecorded telemarketing calls.  It is the actual recipient, 
intended or not, who suffers the nuisance and invasion of 
privacy.  This does not mean that all those within earshot of 
an unwanted robocall are entitled to make a federal case out 
of it.  Congress’s repeated references to privacy convince us 
that a mere houseguest or visitor who picks up the phone 
would likely fall outside the protected zone of interests.  On 
the other hand, a regular user of the phone line who occupies 
the residence being called undoubtedly has the sort of interest 
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in privacy, peace, and quiet that Congress intended to 
protect.14 
 Limiting standing to the intended recipient would 
disserve the very purposes Congress articulated in the text of 
the Act.  If the caller intended to call one party without its 
consent but mistakenly called another, neither the actual 
recipient nor the (uninjured) intended recipient could sue, 
even if the calls continued indefinitely.  We doubt Congress 
meant to leave the actual recipient with no recourse against 
even the most unrelenting caller.  
 
 The District Court, however, focused on the plight of 
the callers, many of whom manage to obtain the consent of 
their intended recipients.  It reasoned as follows: 
If any person who . . . answers the telephone 
call has standing to sue, then businesses will 
never be certain when . . . placing a call with a 
prerecorded message would be a violation of 
the TCPA. Under the statute, a business is 
permitted to send a . . . phone call with a 
prerecorded message to persons who have given 
prior express consent . . . . When a business 
places such a call[,] . . . it does not know 
whether the intended recipient or a roommate or 
employee will answer the phone . . . . If the 
                                              
14 Bank of America suggests that standing must be limited to 
one person because the Act authorizes only one $500 award 
per violation. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).  Putting aside the 
fact that § 227(b)(3) makes available other forms of relief, we 
see no reason why the statutory sum could not be divided 
among the injured parties. 
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business is liable to whomever happens to 
answer the phone[,] . . . a business could face 
liability even when it intends in good faith to 
comply with the provisions of the TCPA. 
(App. 12 (quoting Leyse, 2010 WL 2382400, at *4).)  
 The District Court’s concerns are misplaced.  The 
caller may invoke the consent of the “called party” as a 
defense even if the plaintiff is someone other than the “called 
party.”  Thus, if Dutriaux were the “called party” by virtue of 
being the intended recipient of the call, her consent to receive 
robocalls would shield Bank of America from any suit 
brought by Leyse.  We would not need to deny statutory 
standing to Leyse in order to protect Bank of America from 
unanticipated liability.  On the other hand, if Leyse were the 
“called party” despite being an unintended recipient, it is 
undisputed that he would have statutory standing regardless 
of the policy considerations raised by the District Court.15 
 
 Finally, we observe that “[b]ecause the TCPA is a 
remedial statute, it should be construed to benefit 
                                              
15 We note that in the recent declaratory order of the FCC 
described earlier, the FCC defined the “called party” as the 
“subscriber” or “customary user” of the phone number and 
found that it was “reasonable for callers to rely” on “consent 
to receive robocalls” from either type of called party.  In the 
Matter of Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. 
Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 2015 WL 4387780, at *26 ¶ 73, 
*27 ¶¶ 75-76.  By this logic, Dutriaux and Leyse would both 
qualify as “called parties,” and consent from either would 
shield Bank of America from liability.  
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consumers.”  Gager, 727 F.3d at 271.  Even if the various 
proposed interpretations of the Act were equally plausible—
which they are not—the scales would tip in Leyse’s favor.  
 
 Given the variety of arrangements that exist for 
sharing living spaces and telephones, there may be close 
cases under the zone-of-interests test—at least until cell 
phones entirely displace landlines.  Leyse’s, however, is by 
no means a close case.  The complaint alleges that Bank of 
America placed a call “to Leyse’s residential telephone line.”  
(App. 21.)  At the motion to dismiss stage, we are required to 
treat this allegation as true, and it places Leyse squarely 
within the zone of interests.  
 
 We would reach the same conclusion even if we were 
to look beyond the complaint and consider the allegations 
made by the parties during oral argument and in other actions.  
The parties agree that Leyse’s roommate Dutriaux was the 
subscriber and intended recipient of the call.  But Leyse 
claims that he regularly used the phone, and the fact that he 
was Dutriaux’s roommate indicates that he, too, had a privacy 
interest in avoiding telemarketing calls to their shared home.  
Under the zone-of-interests test, Leyse has alleged enough to 
survive a motion to dismiss, and it was error for the District 
Court to dismiss the complaint for lack of statutory standing.  
We note, however, as we state supra, that it is the actual 
recipient, intended or not, who suffered the nuisance or 
invasion of privacy.  The burden of proof will, therefore, be 
on Leyse in the District Court, to demonstrate that he 
answered the telephone when the robocall was received. 
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III. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order of dismissal and remand for further 
proceedings. 
